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New South Wales has experienced very intense affordability challenges during the 2012 to 2017 Australian housing price 
boom. While negative gearing has attracted the most attention in discussions of affordable housing in the media, other property 
tax elements also have market-distorting effects; here, we consider the effects of the land tax free threshold. We present the 
arguments for freezing the land tax free threshold, and examine the barriers to such a strategy, focusing on the likelihood of 
investor resistance to such a policy initiative by reference to objections to land values used to assess this tax.  
Using ten local government areas (LGAs) in Sydney as case studies, objections to land values used to assess land tax across 
seven years are measured against the land tax free threshold. Census data is used to measure changes in residential property 
investment activity across LGAs and study periods. The article demonstrates that volatility, in particular increases in land 
values, is a primary factor impacting objections to land values in New South Wales. The study concludes that carefully designed 
changes to the land tax free threshold could smooth the transition and reduce objections to land values, while eliminating the 
distorting effects that the land tax free threshold has had on the competition between investors and homebuyers. 
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Property values and taxation have interacted to drive property investment behaviour 
over the last three decades in Australia. The literature on tax reform presents strong 
arguments that allowances and exemptions that once played a positive role now 
contribute to distorting housing investment decisions; these arguments support the 
position that property tax mechanisms are due for review. This article investigates how 
the exemptions offered by Australia’s State (subnational) governments affect the impost 
of land tax and in turn influence investment behaviour. 
As of 2019 Australia’s housing assets were valued at approximately AUD 6.6 trillion, 
representing a decline of AUD 172 billion over the previous 18 months (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2019). While such declines may be argued to have been 
caused to a large extent by Australia’s strong financial system, the factor that influenced 
the most recent decline in values related to the monetary reforms following the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (Hon Kenneth Hayne, chair) of 2019. 
Changes to lending policy and tightening of monetary supply have impacted house 
prices (Stein, 2019) which demonstrates the commitment to reforms that have 
contributed to driving housing prices for the past decade, particularly in Sydney and 
New South Wales.  
Further to monetary policy, taxation is a variable that influences house prices in high-
priced markets. The objective of examining taxation and how it has interacted with 
property markets identifies the potential impact policy changes have had on residential 
house prices, and provides a basis to understand their likely impacts into the future. In 
undertaking this review, it is acknowledged that each tier of government in Australia 
impacts house prices and investment through fiscal imposts or exemptions and 
concessions to some degree. The ability to reform a tax concession in some 
circumstances may be mistakenly perceived to constitute a new tax, even when the 
reform responds to an outdated concession that no longer serves its initial purpose.  
Taking a broader view, tax policy aimed at moderating housing prices and incentivising 
the provision of some types of housing is consistent with the principles expressed in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 a United Nations 
document ratified by Australia in 1975. Article 11(1) of the Covenant commits signatory 
states to ‘recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself 
and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions’. Hohmann (2020, pp. 293-294) argues that reframing 
the Australian discourse on housing affordability in terms of its basis in human rights 
principles is essential if we are to ‘shift the underlying terrain of debate’ and focus on 
housing as a social good rather than an investment good. A close examination of the 
structure and distributional impacts of tax policies can contribute to this new terrain of 
debate.  
                                                     
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028002b6ed. See also Australian Human 
Rights Commission, ‘ICESCR: Human rights at your fingertips’, https://humanrights.gov.au/our-
work/commission-general/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights-human-rights 
(accessed 13 January 2021). 
 
 




While there may be ‘consensus that a coordinated well-designed reform to the treatment 
of housing in the tax system can make a significant contribution to improving housing 
outcomes’ (Eccleston et al., 2018, p. 1), each tier of government plays a role in such 
reform. The ability to deduct a tax imposed by one tier of government (State land tax) 
against tax imposed by a higher tier of government (Commonwealth (national) income 
tax) further accentuates the attractiveness of investment in housing (Australian Treasury 
(2015, p. 24).  
The literature review that follows commences with an overview of changes in home 
ownership rates in Australia over the past two decades (and the impact of investor – 
homebuyer competition on those changes). Next, we review the main taxes applied to 
housing by each level of government. The literature shows that no one tax or tax 
concession alone is a sole factor impacting housing. However, one allowance at the 
State level that may impact investment decisions and competition for housing between 
owner occupiers and investors is of particular interest here. A closer analysis of the 
relationship between the land tax free threshold and objection to land values provides 
an argument for the importance of the transition away from the land tax free status for 
residential investment property. This article provides a guide as to how such reform 
might be designed. 
2. TRENDS IN HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Nationally in Australia, homeownership rates declined slightly between 1961 (72%) and 
2011 (67%) (Yates, 2015). The 2016 Census (ABS, 2017a) reported a further decline in 
national homeownership rates to 65.5%. Homeownership rates would likely be lower 
were it not for Australia’s aging population, with older cohorts far more likely to own 
homes than younger ones. Professor Judith Yates (2015) shows that homeownership 
rates have contracted quite sharply for those in the 25 to 34 year age group (from 60% 
in 1961 to 47% in 2011) and 35 to 44 year group (from 72% to 64%). In 2016, 
homeownership rates among these age groups declined further, to 45% and 62% 
respectively (Daley, Coates & Wiltshire, 2018, p. 70). Other factors than age are at play 
here – changing family composition (such as later childbearing), and changing income 
levels and employment security are likely to be crucial contributors to these trends, 
along with changing migration patterns. 
Burke, Stone and Ralston (2014) examine changing homeownership rates in more 
detail, and while they identify similar declines between 1981 and 2011 for younger 
households, they point out that the sharpest decline was in the 1981 to 1991 period 
(when interest rates were high). Home buying in fact increased for these two younger 
cohorts between 1991 and 2011; the significant decline is in rates of outright 
homeownership. They point to the increasing disparity between higher and lower 
income households’ purchasing ability, with much higher proportions of younger 
purchasers in 2011 from dual-income households (80%) compared to 1981 (50%). Their 
research identifies a variety of adaptive strategies, concluding that ‘the value of home 
ownership is so strong in Australia that there appears to be considerable resilience in 
the tenure, with households responding in various adaptive ways to achieve purchases 
in the face of quite difficult barriers’ (Burke, Stone & Ralston, 2014, p. 2). 
Can we identify a causal link between declining rates of home ownership among 
younger households, and the competition from investor-purchasers, responding to the 
tax incentive regime? Property transaction data from mid-2016 show that investors had 
purchased a higher proportion of low-priced properties in Sydney than owner-occupiers 
 
 




over the prior 12 months (Fitzsimmons, 2016). State policy has adapted by reducing or 
eliminating stamp duty on lower priced homes for first home buyers (Gerathey, 2017), 
and recent changes to lending standards have disproportionately affected highly 
leveraged investor-purchasers (Letts, 2018). These trends suggest that tax policy is at 
most only a partial driver of shifts in the balance between investors and first-time 
buyers; lending standards, investor regulation regimes (abroad as well as within 
Australia) and other direct home buyer incentives are likely to play the dominant role. 
Nevertheless, as political debate continues at the national level around negative gearing 
and other investor incentives, States clearly have a role to play in managing the fallout 
of the intensely competitive investor-purchaser environment of the past half-decade. 
The following section explains the tax environment under the influence of which 
housing markets have evolved in Australia. 
3. THE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND CURRENT STATUS IN AUSTRALIA 
3.1 Commonwealth 
Negative gearing and the capital gains tax (CGT) discount in their application to 
residential property are two tax concessions that have increasingly featured in tax 
debates over the past 30 years in Australia. These concessions have progressively 
continued to distort property markets and embrace outdated objectives that no longer 
serve Australia’s modern housing needs (Wood, Ong & Stewart, 2010; Kelly, 2013). 
3.1.1 Negative gearing 
The Productivity Commission (2004) highlights Australia’s negative gearing provisions 
as being among the most generous of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) member countries. The Australian government removed 
negative gearing in 1985; this reform was repealed two years later following a campaign 
for reinstatement resulting from the negative impact on the Sydney housing rental 
market. In defining the growth of negative gearing in the Australian residential property 
market, Eccleston et al. (2018) refer to estimates from the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO), in highlighting that 63% of all property investors were negatively geared in 
2013-14, compared to just 50% in 1993-94. This incentive boosts investors cash flow 
enhancing their ability to compete against first home owners. 
3.1.2 Capital gains tax 
Eccleston et al. (2018, p. 23) have noted that ‘[t]he CGT discount for individuals and 
trusts represented AUD 6.84 billion in revenue forgone in 2016-17. Because most 
capital gains are accrued and realised by taxpayers with high taxable incomes, the 
benefits of the discount flow disproportionately to these households’. Among the 
provisions that have led to a distorted and inequitable distribution of housing assets and 
outcomes in the housing market, Kelly (2013) defines the CGT exemption applied to 
the main residence as encouraging over-investment in existing housing by owner 
occupiers.   
In highlighting the impact of the capital gains tax exemption on the home, Yates (2010) 
refers to the report of the Senate Select Committee on Housing Affordability in 
Australia (2008, [4.38]), in stating that the capital gains tax subsidy ‘favours home 
owners, not home ownership’ (Yates 2010, p. 63). Overinvestment of owner-occupied 
housing further extends to include the store of wealth in housing that is fuelled by 
demand that outstrips supply, in which Yates (2009, p. 37) states: 
 
 




As demand side subsidies that create an economic incentive to 
increasing consumption of housing through home ownership, they add 
to price pressures in the housing market and thereby contribute to the 
affordability constraints faced by aspiring home owners. 
3.2 State and local government 
Eccleston et al. (2018, p. 41 (references omitted)) have noted that: 
[i]n Australia, there are currently three forms of subnational tax on land and 
residential property: transfer duties, state land tax and local government rates. 
These taxes together raised over $40 billion in 2014-15, which was 10.1 per 
cent of all taxes collected in Australia. They are an important source of revenue 
for state and local governments, with transfer duty particularly lucrative ($18.5 
billion in 2014-15, or almost half of all property tax). 
Despite their revenue significance, however, there is agreement in the literature 
that state property taxes are poorly designed and require reform. … Transfer 
duties on property are inefficient, subject to housing market volatility, and 
responsible for under-utilisation of housing stock and constrained housing 
mobility.  
Introducing a recurrent property tax on a broad base with few exemptions would provide 
a more stable, efficient source of revenue. Mangioni and Warren (2014) further state 
that that the efficiency factor often referred to is driven by the principle that property 
values are determined on highest and best use of land.  
Transfer duties impose a ‘large, up-front cost’ on property, which impacts the optimal 
use of housing; Furthermore, ‘[b]ecause transfer duty revenue depends on the volume 
and value of transactions in the market, it is unpredictable and vulnerable to market 
disruptions’ (Eccleston et al., p. 41, citing Henry Review, 2009 and Productivity 
Commission, 2018). In contrast to other State imposed taxes, Figure 1 sets out the 
volatility in revenue from transfer tax compared with land tax and council rates. As 
Eccleston et al. conclude (2018, p. 41), ‘[s]hifting to a recurrent property tax would 
generate a significant efficiency dividend through greater stability in state revenue, 
improved transparency within the tax system while enhancing residential mobility and 
housing affordability (Daley & Coates, 2015; Henry Review, 2009; Mangioni, 2016)’. 
While recurrent land and property taxation is stated to be economically efficient and 
least distortive of the property taxes, its perception by taxpayers is not readily accepted 
nor always understood and the base on which this tax is set is subject to challenge. It is 
this factor, challenges to land values that this article now turns to in examining 
objections against the contestable component of this tax, namely the land value on 
which this tax is assessed in New South Wales. While a number of studies have 
examined the benefits of transitioning from transaction taxes to a broad-based land tax, 
what has yet to be examined is how land tax may be expanded and the potential 








Fig. 1: Tax Revenue from Stamp Duty, Land Tax and Council Rates (AUD million) 
 
Source: ABS (2017b). 
 
4. THE ASSESSMENT OF LAND TAX AND THE TAX-FREE THRESHOLD 
In this section we set out an overview of this tax, its relationship to concepts of human 
rights to which Australia adheres, and the component parts used to assess land tax in 
New South Wales.  
Table 1 sets out the component parts of the tax in the first column, with a summary of 
how these components apply to the assessment process in the second column.  
Table 1: Land Tax Components 
Components Application Summary 
Tax base / basis 
of value 
The bases of value on which land tax is assessed varies 
marginally across the six States being either Land or Site 
Value. In NSW the land value is re-determined every year 
for the 2.5 million dollar parcels of land across the State. 
Rate-in-the-
dollar 
This rate is applied to the land value to assess the land tax 




Depicts the various ownership types in which land is held 
and these comprise individual persons, companies or trusts.  
Investor Tax 
Free Threshold 
Exemption applied to State land tax and is distinguished by 
a number of factors including the use of the property and the 
taxpaying entity. This threshold is re-determined annually 
and is adjusted by general movement in the value of land 
across the state, excluding rural use land. 
Land Tax 
Exemptions 
The two main exemptions that apply are to the principal 
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New South Wales initially introduced land tax in 1895, abolishing it in 1906 making 
way for the Commonwealth and local government to collect this tax. It reintroduced this 
tax in 1956 following the Commonwealth’s abolition of the tax in 1952. New South 
Wales was the first State to introduce a land tax free threshold which was set at AUD 
55,000 in 1972. By 1987 the tax-free threshold was $94,000 with a tax rate-in-the-dollar 
of 2%. The initial rationale for introducing the land tax free threshold is stated by 
Mangioni (2016) as being to incentivise residential property investment with a view to 
encouraging more rental housing stock. By the late 1980s the government came under 
pressure to increase the land tax threshold which progressively increased to $125,000 
in 1988, $135,000 in 1989 and $160,000 in 1990, where the threshold remained without 
adjustment for eight years.   
Following revenue pressure, in 2004 the New South Wales Government concurrently 
announced the introduction of a tax on the sale of residential property and an amendment 
to the State land tax free threshold to commence in the 2005 tax year. The Vendor Duty 
was imposed on all residential property excluding the principal place of residence 
(subject to being owned for a minimum of two years) at a rate of 2.25% of the sale price 
(New South Wales Parliament, 2004). The implications for investors with investment 
properties which were below the land tax threshold before the changes in 2005, was an 
incurrence of up to $1,268 increase per year. The upside to the 2005 changes to land tax 
was the reduction in the rate-in-the-dollar from 1.7 cents to 1.4 cents. The breakeven 
point of no change in land tax payable was for investors with an aggregate land value 
of approximately $405,000 in the 2005 land tax year. 
It is apt to highlight here that the land tax free threshold does not apply to each property 
held by the same owner. The threshold only applies once to the aggregate land value of 
all property (excluding exempt property) held by a property owner. Once the tax-free 
threshold has been reached, a tax incentive exists for investors that allows the 
deductibility of land tax as an expense against the income generated from the property, 
or where that expense exceeds the income from that property, against other assessable 
income as shown in Figure 2. In essence, State land tax is a mechanism used by State 
government, to redistribute the tax revenue collected by the Commonwealth as a 
deduction against the impost of a State-imposed tax. One could argue for its basis in 
principles of human rights (in particular the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights) defining the role of housing in guaranteeing a minimum quality of 
life.  
This tax subsidy is achieved on the basis that the rent collected from property is defined 
as income and land tax is an expense. What has evolved as a challenge for the States is 
accepting that any taxpayer would prefer not to pay tax and hence the land tax free 












4.1 The case for land tax reform in New South Wales 
Over the past two decades studies have modelled replacement of revenue from stamp 
duty with revenue from a broad base land tax and how this might be achieved on a 
revenue neutral basis (Productivity Commission, 2004; Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT) Government, 2012). The Australian Capital Territory’s 2014 progressive 
transition from stamp duty to a broad based land tax as an exemplar reform for the States 
of Australia to follow. The Australian Capital Territory land tax applies to all residential 
property excluding the principal place of residence, being an exemption that applies 
consistently in each State. In preparing for the transition to a land tax on residential 
investment property in the Australian Capital Territory, residential property owners 
were advised ahead of its introduction, which facilitated a progressive phase-in impact 
to the value of investment property holdings.  
The Australian Capital Territory rate-in-the-dollar applied to the unimproved value 
commences at 0.50 cents and progressively increases to a maximum of 1.1 cents. Across 
Australia this is the lowest rate-in-the-dollar applied to the highest band of property 
values. The broadening of the base to include all residential investment property without 
an investor free threshold has resulted in more property being taxed at a lower rate, thus 
more broadly spreading the burden while replacing revenue from stamp duty. In New 
South Wales, reforms are under consideration for residential property purchasers to opt 
for an annual land tax in lieu of stamp duty with a view to potentially improving 
affordability by reducing up-front transaction costs (New South Wales Treasury, 2020). 
This reform would further assist government by replacing stamp duty revenue which is 
volatile and subject to the volume of property turnover from one year to another with a 
more stable tax base. By removing the transaction of property as the trigger for the tax, 
the potential reform uses the annual land value currently used to assess land tax as the 
base of the tax with the trigger set at an annually defined date. Further research that goes 
beyond the scope of this article is needed to evaluate alternate tax policy reforms and 
options in targeting greater affordability.  
In contrast to the introduction of the land tax in the Australian Capital Territory, in New 
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proposed reform to broaden the land tax net would commence with the phase-out of the 
investor tax-free threshold. In contrast to the revenue replacement approach to reform, 
the research undertaken in this article aims to look at the potential resistance to phasing 
out the tax-free threshold in New South Wales. While it is beyond the scope and 
objective of this article to model the phase-out, the more important objective is to 
examine the resistance to the payment of land tax through objections to the land value 
component as set out in Table 1. The value is the variable component on which tax 
revenue increases each year and, more relevantly to this article, is the primary 
component of the tax that investors are able to object to in challenging this tax. 
In May 2004 the New South Wales Government announced its intent to abolish the land 
tax free threshold in New South Wales from the 2005 land tax year, and reduce the top 
rate-in the-dollar from 1.7 to 1.4 cents-in-the-dollar (New South Wales Parliament, 
2004). This reform resulted in the number of property owners subject to land tax 
increasing from 120,000 to 660,000 in New South Wales predominantly being 
residential property owners. This reform also resulted in objections to land values across 
New South Wales increasing to over 16,000; the reform was deemed to have been 
poorly executed and the threshold was reinstated for the 2006 land tax year. While the 
idea of removing the threshold was well-founded, as in any tax reform, the transition 
was manifestly inadequate with the threshold removed with six months notice provided 
and no economic scaffolding to manage the increase in objections that followed. 
While small scale investors (who dominate the rental housing market in Australia) have 
enjoyed a range of tax incentives implicitly justified as a way to lower rents by 
increasing returns to landlords, it is unclear these de facto subsidies have had these 
effects in practice (Berry, 2000). The Reserve Bank estimates that the impact of 
removing negative gearing would be lower housing prices, and higher homeownership 
rates (reported in Ong, 2017), this in turn would constitute an overall net gain for 
Australians. 
Offsetting arguments that investor tax incentives help lower the cost of rental housing 
are analyses demonstrating the longer term welfare consequences of falling rates of 
homeownership, particularly on retirement (Stebbing & Spies-Butcher, 2016). 
Intensifying inequality between owners and renters (particularly along generational 
lines) will also have longer term effects on social stability and the socio-economic 
integration that underpins both quality of life and economic growth (Daley et al., 2018).  
5. RESEARCH METHOD 
The two factors examined in this article are the changes in residential property 
investment holdings in the case study areas over the study period and whether the land 
tax free threshold is the primary factor impacting objections to land values used to 
determine land tax. In addressing these points, primary data has been provided by the 
New South Wales Valuer-General and Department of Land and Property Information, 
with secondary data sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). In 
undertaking the review, the New South Wales Valuer-General provided objection data 
to land values from ten local government areas located within 15 kilometres of the centre 
of Sydney over seven land tax years (2011 to 2017). 
As at the date of this analysis there were 41 local government areas within the Sydney 
metropolitan area, of which the sample of ten local government areas analysed 
represents approximately 25% of local government areas (LGAs). The rationale for 
 
 




selection of these local government areas is based their geographic proximity to the 
centre of Sydney; the highest values in Sydney are within these locations. A majority of 
the properties that attract State land tax are located within these local government areas. 
The New South Wales Valuer-General’s Office provided the land value objection data 
across these local government areas, which span a seven year period, used to determine 
the values being made available to land tax payers. 
In analysing the number of objections to land values, two factors were considered. The 
first consideration was the location in which objections were grouped by local 
government area. The second consideration was the change in the number of objections 
between each of the base dates of valuation. In New South Wales, each parcel of land 
is valued annually as at 1 July each year; this is known as the base date and is used to 
assess land tax in New South Wales for the following land tax year. The analysis was 
undertaken using objection data on land values between base dates 1 July 2010 and 1 
July 2016, which apply to the respective land tax years of 2011 to 2017 inclusive. The 
data was analysed to address the following four questions for the ten local government 
areas: 
1. How did the proportionate share of rental property change between the 2011 and 
2016 census dates? 
2. What were the key trends in the volume of objections across inner Sydney between 
2011 and 2017 land tax years, for houses and units? 
3. How did the volume and proportion of objections below and above the land tax free 
threshold change across each local government area between 2011 and 2017, for 
houses and units? 
4. How did trends in objections to land values relative to the land tax free threshold 
change in the 2016 land tax year? 
6. FINDINGS 
Table 2 (columns C and F) shows that between the 2011 and 2016 census dates there 
was an increase in the percentage of rental property in eight of the ten LGAs.2 Mosman 
LGA has no change between these census dates, while a decrease is noted in Woollahra. 
These two LGAs have the highest land values for both houses and units and have the 
lowest percentage of rented property as at the two census dates. It is further shown in 
Table 2 that there was an increase in residential unit dwellings during this period in nine 
of the ten LGAs with the exception of Leichhardt. Correspondingly, it is noted that there 
was a decrease in the number of houses in seven of the ten LGAs. Of the five LGAs 
with the largest increases in percentage of rental housing, three LGAs (Ashfield, 
Marrickville and Burwood) are located in the Inner West and two LGAs (Botany and 
Randwick) are located in Sydney East. In addressing the first question, we find an 
increase in the percentage of rented dwellings in the inner suburbs of Sydney and that 
as Sydney densifies, owner occupiers are indeed competing with investors for housing 
stock, particularly in the unit market. 
To answer the second question, we commence by looking at the overall trends in 
objections to land values across inner Sydney in Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4 for houses 
                                                     
2 See Appendix for Tables 2 to 6 and Figures 3 to 7. 
 
 




and units between the 2010 and 2016 tax years. Next, we review the number of 
objections below and above the tax-free threshold in each LGA and draw conclusions 
about the relationship between median land values and the land tax threshold, for houses 
and units in each LGA over the study period. Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4 show 4,565 
objections to land values for houses and 968 objections to land values for units. Across 
the study period different trends are evident. Over the 2009 to 2012 period, we find 
higher volatility in objections to land values for units compared to houses. The levels of 
volatility in objections to land values are similar for houses and units between 2013 and 
2016. For both categories of dwellings, there is a sharp upward trend in objections in 
2015-2016, which corresponds with the strong demand for housing and increase in 
values that peaked 12 months following that last period (the 2017 land tax year). 
Addressing question 3, Table 4 and Figure 5 set out the percentage of objections to land 
values above and below the land tax free threshold for houses in each LGA. In nine of 
the ten LGAs, over 90% of objections are lodged against land values above the tax-free 
threshold on the basis that the land values are too high. The exception is Marrickville, 
where 20% of objections were lodged for houses valued below the threshold. We 
conclude that objections to land values used to assess land tax would primarily be lodged 
in cases of land values above the tax-free threshold as shown in objections to land values 
for houses. This supports the rationale that payment of land tax itself is one trigger for 
objections to land tax; however it does not provide the reasoning for why the objection 
is lodged, particularly where the land value is correct or is at the conservative end of the 
market value range. This factor is discussed next, in the analysis of objections to land 
values for units and again later in the analysis of the median land values against the land 
tax free threshold. 
The review of objections to land values for units (in Table 5 and Figure 6) shows that 
in seven of the ten LGAs, more than 50% of objections to land values are below the tax-
free threshold, which is in stark contrast to the percentage of objections to houses. It is 
important to reinforce the operation of the land tax free threshold again here in the 
assessment of land tax. The threshold only applies once to the aggregate land value of 
all property (excluding exempt property) held by a property owner, it does not apply to 
each property held in the same ownership. This provides insight into the likely rationale 
for objections to land values below the tax-free threshold: objections reflect the interests 
of owners holding multiple residential investment properties. The increase in objections 
is further emphasised by the increase noted in rented dwellings between the 2011 and 
2016 census dates, which potentially renders more property liable to pay land tax once 
the land value trips the tax-free threshold.  
In the objections to unit values, Randwick and Botany Bay stand out in Sydney East 
with 96% and 67% of objections to land values below the threshold. In the Inner West, 
Marrickville and Ashfield stand out with 59% and 100% respectively. In Sydney North, 
Mosman and North Sydney have objection rates of 55% and 62%. While these objection 
rates may appear high and in the case of units are likely to be impacted by multiple 
holdings pushing investors over the tax-free threshold, we now go back to Table 3 and 
Figures 3 and 4, to examine the spike in objections in the 2017 land tax year. Of all 
objections lodged across the six years examined, 37.7% were lodged against house land 
values and 41.5% were lodged against land values to units in the 2015 and 2016 tax 
years. The increase in objections to land values aligns with the increase in land values 
across these same two years. This provides evidence that tripping the tax-free threshold 
 
 




and thus incurring land tax is the primary reason for objections lodged against land 
values. 
We now examine whether factors other than the payment of land tax itself impact 
objections to land values, to better define the prospect of expanding the land tax net to 
include all residential investment property. In further examining the increase in 
objections to land values in the 2016 land tax year as shown in Figures 3 and 4, we have 
undertaken a closer analysis on an LGA-by-LGA basis. Using the median land value 
for houses and units for each LGA as set out in Table 6, we graph these values against 
the land tax free threshold in Figure 7. In the review of land values for houses, 
Randwick, Botany and Waverley in Sydney East and Burwood, Ashfield and 
Marrickville in the Inner West show the largest increase in land values as shown in 
Table 6 and Figure 7. In each of these LGAs the land values are well above the land tax 
free threshold and highlight that the increase in land value that translates into higher 
land tax assessment impacts objections to values. The median land values in these LGAs 
have been above the tax-free threshold across the study period. The reason stated in 92% 
of objections lodged to land values for houses was that the land value was too high. 
In the review of units, in which the total number of objections are 21% of objections 
lodged against house land values, Table 6 shows that the highest increases in land values 
are in Randwick, Burwood, Ashfield and Marrickville. The latter three of these are the 
LGAs that have the highest increases in rented dwellings. It is also noted that the median 
land value for units is below the tax-free threshold in each LGA as set out in Figure 7. 
It is noted that in Randwick and Marrickville the median land value for units represents 
58% and 34% of the tax-free threshold. At the median land value investors can hold 
almost two units in Randwick and three units in Marrickville before tripping the tax-
free threshold in 2016 of $482,000. While payment of land tax is one trigger for lodging 
objections to land values for units, the relative size of the increase in land value is also 
one of the primary factors driving increases in objections. 
7. A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM AND CONCLUSION 
In planning for the removal of the land tax free threshold and defining the impact on 
objections to land values by residential investors, we now consider the justification for 
the threshold and how a transition for removal would be achieved. In 1972 when the 
tax-free threshold was introduced, home ownership rates were at 71%. The 
homeownership rate at 2016 was 65.5%, and investors increasingly compete for 
residential property at the lower end of the market. In seven of the ten LGAs examined 
in this article, increases in the percentage of rented property were noted in LGAs 
between the 2011 and 2016 census dates. It is well-established that tax incentives 
afforded to investors (as discussed in the literature) are a contributing factor for this 
competition. 
It was further argued that land tax is a deductible expense against the income derived 
from investment property that shifts the burden of the tax from the States to the 
Commonwealth through tax expenditure afforded by deductibility of the tax against 
income from investment property. The rationale for the land tax free threshold to 
incentivise more rental property 50 years after its introduction is ripe for re-evaluation 
and policy reform, as investor-homebuyer competition for housing continues to 
intensify. To provide investors a tax-free threshold and a deduction for expenses is an 
outdated and unnecessary incentive, particularly in the Sydney housing market. While 
it is recognised that a proportion of land tax payers in the residential housing market use 
 
 




secondary residences for recreational purposes, Mangioni (2016, p. 109) discusses that 
this factor should not impact the argument for reform to the land tax free threshold.  
The analyses in this article demonstrate two important outcomes that prompt reform. 
The first is that in each of the LGAs examined, the tax-free threshold incentivises small 
residential unit property investors over investors with houses with the tax-free threshold 
sitting between units and houses in all LGAs. Secondly, while objections to units are 
lower in volume compared with houses, objections to land values of units below the tax-
free threshold are tenfold compared with those for house land values. This in part is 
driven by the fact that the median land value for houses is well above the tax-free 
threshold, but also conversely shows the trend towards multiple unit holdings, 
particularly in some LGAs. 
What the article finds is that the payment of land tax is not overwhelmingly the only 
factor that triggers objection to land values. The analyses clearly show that the size of 
the increase in land values that impacts the amount of land tax paid as set out in the 
2016 land tax year is a significant contributor to increases in objections to land values 
on the basis that the value is too high. This raises the question of how the reforms that 
might be adopted could manage the spikes in objections during periods of rapid house 
price inflation. In summary, if there were an increase in the rate of objections 
proportionate with the increase in the number of investment properties caught in the 
land tax net, the issue is how this reform might be managed and what mechanisms are 
available for a smooth transition to the removal of the tax-free threshold.  
In removing the tax-free threshold, a phase-in approach has been developed comprising 
four measures that support a smooth transition and address those factors that hampered 
the 2005 attempts at removing the tax-free threshold in New South Wales. The proposed 
measures are set out in the summary below and address the key elements of the 
threshold, land value, rate-in-the-dollar and payment mechanism. In contrast to 
removing the threshold in one tax year, a progressive phase in approach of freezing the 
tax-free threshold for a minimum of five years would apply. This would result in 
residential investment property, in particular residential unit investment, below the tax-
free threshold moving progressively into paying the tax. To address the spike in land 
values that impacts objections as noted in the 2016 land tax year, extending the average 
land value from three to five years would also factor in cyclical corrections to values in 
the years of high property value growth. The rate-in-the-dollar should be maintained, or 
where additional revenue is raised as more property becomes liable for land tax, 
acknowledgement provided of a downward adjustment to the rate at three or five years 
of introduction of the reform, returning a portion of the gain in revenue raised back to 
property investors. The final reform is to more evenly stagger the payment options for 
the tax across the year as regular quarterly payments which better acclimatise taxpayers 











Summary of Reform Phase-In Measures 
Phase-in Measure Tax component Rationale 
Freeze the tax-free 
threshold in the tax 
year ahead 
Threshold Mechanism used to allow a staged 
phase-in of a threshold removal. 
Increase the average 
land value used to 
assess the tax from 3 to 
5 years. 
Land Value Smooth the changes, and in particular 
increases in land values used to assess 
the tax. 
Maintain the current 
flat rate-in-the-dollar 
structure for the impost 




To further add to the support of the 
proposed reform, provide certainty that 
the current flat rate (excluding the 
premium rate) is maintained. 
Increase options for 
payment across three 
equal instalments 
across the year. 




This analysis unpacks the dynamics behind one tax base measure that contributes to 
favouring investors over first time home buyers. Further research is needed to evaluate 
alternative tax policy reforms targeting greater affordability. For instance, one 
alternative might be to end the exemption of the primary residence (while retaining the 
tax-free threshold); this would, in effect, remove the tax-free threshold from all property 
beyond the family home, and may partially remove the threshold for more expensive 
homes. How would the impacts of such a measure compare with those of reforms such 
as ending negative gearing? While history demonstrates that reforms to investor 
incentives are notoriously difficult to impose, we argue that the likelihood for significant 
backlash can be managed through careful policy design. The recent history of reactions 
to the land tax free measure (in the form of objections to value estimates) provides a 
unique lens through which we can better understand taxpayer/investor responses to 
changing market conditions and taxation regimes, and apply this insight to policy 
design. Following Hohmann’s (2020) argument for research that will ‘shift the 
underlying terrain of debate’, focusing on taxpayer responses to policy outcomes can 
help re-shape perceptions of the potential for reforms that contribute to greater social 
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND GRAPHS SUPPORTING THE ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
 
 
Table 2: Change in Residential Rental Property between the 2011 to 2016 Census 

























Mosman 5523 5160 34.3 5240 5701 34.3 10.5 (5.1) 0 
Nth Sydney 8104 20175 50 7520 22381 50.8 10.9 (7.2) 0.8 
Woollahra 9516 10841 38 9203 11632 37.3 6.8 (3.3) (0.7) 
Waverley 9617 15039 46.7 8938 15758 47.6 4.8 (7.1) 0.9 
Randwick 21598 25244 44.9 21627 28109 46.9 11.3 0.13 2.0 
Botany Bay 7643 6371 37.6 7653 8579 43.6 34.7 0.13 6.0 
Leichhardt 4105 1292 39.8 4139 1177 40.1 (8.9) 0.8 0.3 
Burwood 6830 3824 36.6 6687 5124 41.8 34 (2.1) 5.2 
Ashfield 3169 5221 45.1 2657 5665 51.3 8.5 (16.2) 6.2 
Marrickville 5430 3647 41.9 5094 4411 45.3 21 (6.2) 3.4 
 
 
Table 3: Annual Number of Objections to House Land Values, All LGAs, 2010 – 2017 
Objections 1/07/09 1/07/10 1/07/11 1/07/12 1/07/13 1/07/14 1/07/15 1/07/16 Totals 
Houses 516 470 500 511 330 515 1045 678 4565 
Units 101 142 111 71 64 78 209 192 968 
 
 
















Bay Burwood Leichhardt Marrickville Mosman 
Nth 
Sydney Randwick Waverley Woollahra 
Above 93% 95% 99% 96% 80% 98% 99% 98% 100% 98% 

































Table 5: Percentage of Objections to Units Above versus Below the Thresholds 2010 to 2017 
Units Ashfield 
Botany 
Bay Burwood Leichhardt Marrickville Mosman 
Nth 
Sydney Randwick Waverley Woollahra 
Above 0% 33% 49% 70% 41% 38% 45% 4% 65% 70% 


































































North Sydney $1,150,000 $1,300,000 13% $200,000 $222,000 11% 0.8 
Woollahra $1,550,000 $1,720,000 11% $265,000 $294,000 11% (0.7) 
Waverley $1,230,000 $1,550,000 26% $281,000 $328,000 17% 0.9 
Randwick $888,000 $1,190,000 34% $217,000 $278,000 28% 2.0 
Botany Bay $745,000 $957,000 28% $116,000 $139,000 20% 6.0 
Leichhardt $715,000 $907,000 27% $197,000 $237,000 20% 0.3 
Burwood $703,000 $897,000 28% $135,000 $170,000 26% 5.2 
Ashfield $710,000 $913,000 29% $152,000 $191,000 26% 6.2 
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